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100			_a Bruzzon, Victor _949005
245			_aThe moral limits of autonomous democracy for planning theory: A critique of Purcell/
260			_bSage, _c2019.
300			_aVol 18, Issue 1, 2019 : (82-99 p.).
520			_aThis article tests the moral limits of autonomous democracy applied to planning theory by offering a critique of the recent work of Mark Purcell. In the first part, I situate Purcell’s view as a pure example of autonomous democracy applied to urban politics and planning. I argue that his view relies on the claim that there is something morally problematic about decision-making in planning that is not exercised autonomously and democratically. Indeed, his approach depends on the claim that autonomous democratic control in planning is morally superior. I consider two arguments for why we might agree. The first is by arguing that indirect centralized (heteronomous) power structures alienate people from their originary state of autonomous control. The second is by arguing that autonomous democracy will lead to the morally best outcomes. Ultimately, I conclude that neither argument works well and that there are not conclusive reasons for thinking that there is something morally better about autonomous democracy as a decision-making structure in planning compared to other forms that don’t rely on direct democratic control.
650			_aautonomy, _949006
650			_a democracy, _949007
650			_amoral theory, _949008
650			_aplanning, _948639
650			_asocial movements, _949009
650			_aurban politics _949010
773	0		_08831 _916470 _dLondon Sage Publications Ltd. 2002 _tPlanning theory _x1473-0952
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1177/1473095218776042
942			_2ddc _cART
999			_c12389 _d12389